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Abstract— Using data of listed firms on Hochiminh Stock 
Exchange, the study examines determinants of corporate 
disclosure in financial statements. In line with the 
literature, the findingsshow that firm size, the use of 
financial leverage and the presence of supervision board 
have a positive influence on corporate disclosure. 
Furthermore, auditing firm (whether a Big4 or not) also 
plays an important role in the degree of information 
disclosure by firms.Contradicting to the literature, 
however state ownership and the proportion of non-
executive members in director board show a negative 
relation to corporate disclosure level. These counter 
factscanbe explained by real situations of Vietnam over 
the studied period. Finally, the concurrent role between 
chair of director board and managing director reduces 
corporate disclosure degree, as predicted by the agency 
theory. 
Keywords— Corporate disclosure, listed firms, Vietnam, 
signaling theory, agency theory . 
  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate disclosure is very necessary and important for 
investors on the financial market. The more corporate 
disclosureis provided to the market, the less asymmetric 
information is between firmsand investors, and also 
between firms and other agents (government agencies, 
banks, business partners).This help to reduces agency 
problem. Corporate disclosure hence is an important 
factor that directly influences the decision making of 
market participants who mainly obtain information 
through firm’sfinancial statements. The obtaining and 
screening of corporate information is even more 
necessary for investors in an emerging stock market like 
Vietnam. However, the disclosure degreevaries among 
firms and its determinants havestill been an open question 
for both academics and practioners.  
Many empirical studies on the determinants ofcorporate 
disclosurein financial statementshave been implemented 
for countries around the world (e.g., Patton and Zelenka, 
1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Owusu-Ansah, 1998; 
Bushman, Piotroski et al. Cheung, Connelly et al., 2006 ... 
..). For Vietnam, research on this issue is also conducted, 
for example, Phuong and Phuong (2014). Nevertheless, 
this study is different from the previous ones in a number 
of aspects. Firstly, in this study, the effect of some factors 
that are not considered bythe other research is 
investigated (e.g.,fixed assets, sectors, corporate 
governance variables such as the size and composition of 
director board, management structure and board of 
supervisors). In addition, the sample in this study has a 
slightly larger number of observations than previous ones, 
which shows a better representation for Vietnamese listed 
firms. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In 
section 2, empirical studies on the issue are reviewed, 
while the methodology is presented in section 3. Section 4 
shows empirical results of the study. Finally, conclusions 
and policy recommendations are shown in section 5. 
 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY 
Examples of empirical research on the determinants of 
corporate disclosure for countries in the world can be seen 
as follows. Singhvi (1968) examines the factors 
influencing corporate disclosure of Indian companies in 
the period from 1963 to 1965, including firm size, profit, 
marginal profit, auditing firm, management type and 
major shareholder number. The results show that size, 
management structureand major shareholder numberare 
statistically related to corporate disclosure, while the 
remaining variables are not correlated to corporate 
disclosure. Raffournier (1995) teststhe influence of size, 
financial leverage,profitability, ownership structure, 
internationalized degree, auditor’s size, the fixed-asset-to-
total-asset ratio and sector on disclosure of Swiss listed 
firms in 1991. Results show that only size and 
internationalized degrees play astatistically significant 
role in the company's disclosure policy. Patton and 
Zelenka (1997) find that auditing type, number of 
International Journal of Advanced Engineering, Management and Science (IJAEMS)                     [Vol-3, Issue-5, May- 2017] 
https://dx.doi.org/10.24001/ijaems.3.5.11                                                                                                                  ISSN: 2454-1311 
www.ijaems.com                                                                                                                                                                          Page | 475  
employees, status of listed securities and returns on equity 
show a significant effect on the corporate disclosure of 
joint-stock firms in Czech Republic. Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) points out that size, ownership structure, age, 
internationalized degree and profitability are significantly 
associated with disclosure of listed firms in Zimbabwe. 
For listed firms in Kenya in 1992-2001, Barako (2007) 
find that corporate governance features and corporate 
characteristics.In Vietnam, studies using different 
approaches, significantly influence corporate disclosure 
and data samples are also conducted. For example, 
Phuong and Phuong (2014) show that size, auditing firm, 
profitability, listing time and ownership of foreign 
shareholders are significantly related to the corporate 
disclosure of 99 listed firms on Hochi minh stock 
exchange in 2011. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
The sample consists of 198 non-financial listed firms 
(accounting for approximately of 66% of the population). 
Data are obtained from the audited financial statements in 
2013 of listed firms on the Ho Chi Minh stock exchange. 
Financialsare not included in the sample due to their 
particular characteristics, i.e they are subject to strict 
regulations and have a different accounting mechanism. 
3.2 Empirical specification: 
Dependent variable - corporate disclosure index: 
Since firms produce the financial statements subject to 
Decision 16/2006, together with the Circular 210/2009-
BTC and 244/2009-BTC issued by Ministry of Finance of 
Vietnam, the list of corporate disclosure itemsis 
constructedbased on these legal documents. This study 
utilizes the approach by previous studies with some 
adjustments for current context of Vietnam.More 
specifically, all possible disclosure items from financial 
statements shown in notes to financial statement are 
taken.Hence, a checklist of maximum number of 120 
disclosure items in the financial statements, comprising of 
both legally compulsory and voluntary disclosure items, 
is presented in table 1.1Then the corporate disclosure 
index, measuring the corporate disclosure degree,is 
calculated by the ratio of number of disclosed items to the 
maximum number of disclosure items (e.g., Barako 
(2007)). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The list of items is available upon request. 
Table.1.Summary of corporate disclosure items in financial 
statements 
Contents 
Number of 
items 
Items are related to balance sheet  52 
Items are related to income statement  12 
Items are related to cash flow statement 6 
Items must be presented on notes to 
financial statements as required by circular 
210/2009/TT-BTC issued by Ministry of 
Finance   
13 
Items are indicated to notes to financial 
statements itself 
37 
Total 120 
 
Corporate disclosure indexreads  
𝐼𝑗 =
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑛𝑗
𝑖=1
𝑛𝑗
 
in which:Ij is  disclosure of firm j (0≤Ij≤1); nj shows the 
maximum number of disclosed items of firm j (nj ≤ 120); 
Xij = 1 if item ioccurs and is released by firm, Xij = 0 if 
the item i occurs but is unreleased by firm, Xij is not 
counted if item i does not occur; Xijcomprises of both 
obligatory and  disclosed items. All these items (Xij) are 
equally weighed summedin calculating corporate 
disclosure index Ijto avoid biases in assigning weights to 
items due to subjective assessments. 
Definition of all independent variables: 
Based on the literature, this study investigates a number 
offactors which can be classified into two groups: 
corporate operating characteristics and corporate 
governance characteristics, (see, e.g., Hossainet al, 1994; 
Wallace vàNaser, 1995; Barako, 2007; PhươngvàPhương, 
2014; Singhvi, 1968;Ahmed và Courtis,1999).All 
independent variables are definedas follows: 
+ Variables proxy for corporate operating 
characteristics: 
SIZE (Billion VND) - Corporate size: defined as logarithm 
of total sales 
QRATIO (Times) - Quick ratio: defined as [short-term 
assets – inventories] divided by short-term debts. 
PROFIT (%) - Profitability: defined as net profits divided 
by total sales 
DEBT (Times) - Debt ratio: defined as total debts divided 
by owner’s equity 
FASSETS (%) - Fixed assets: defined as [fixed assets – 
accumulated depreciation] divided by total assets 
BIG4 - Audit firm: Equal to 1 if firm is audited by a Big4-
auditing firm, and equal to 0 otherwise 
LTIME (Years) - Listing time: defined as the time period 
from listing year up to year of 2013 
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SECTOR - Sectors: Equal to 1 if firm is inmanufacturing 
sector, and equal to 0 otherwise 
FOREIGN (%) - Foreign ownership: defined as foreigner-
owned shares divided by total shares 
STATE (%) - State ownership: defined as state-owned 
shares divided by total shares 
+ Variables proxy for corporate governance 
characteristics: 
BOARDSIZE (people) - Director board size: defined as 
number of members in director board 
BOARDCOMP (%) - Director board composition: defined 
as number of non-executive director members divided by 
total number of members in director board 
DUALITY - Chairperson of director board takes dual 
positions: Equal to 1 if firm’s chairman of director board 
is concurrent the general director, and equal to 0 
otherwise  
SUPERV - Supervision board: Equal to 1 if firm has a 
supervision board, and equal to 0 otherwise 
3.3 Estimation method 
The regression specification is estimated using OLS 
method. In addition, the tests to check for reliability of the 
regression resultsare also performed such as multi-
collinearity (variance inflation factor 
(VIF)),heteroschedasticity (White test) and 
autocorrelation (Lagrange (LM)). 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Correlation matrix between variables and summary statistics of variables  
The correlation matrix between variables is presented in table 2, while table 3 shows the summary statistics of all variables. 
As  can  be seen from Table  2,  the  correlation  between  variables  is  fairly small (almost less than 0.4), therefore the 
possible effects of multi-collinearity in OLS regressions are negligible. Yet, a statistical check via VIF test is sobering.  
Table.2: Correlation matrix between variables 
 
SIZ
E 
QRA
TIO 
PRO
FIT 
DE
BT 
FASS
ETS 
BIG
4 
LTI
ME 
SECT
OR 
FORE
IGN 
STA
TE 
BOARD
SIZE 
BOARD
COMP 
DUAL
ITY 
SUPE
RV 
SIZE 1                           
QRATIO 
-
0.31
70 
1                         
PROFIT 
0.16
72 
0.147
2 
1                       
DEBT 
0.21
24 
-
0.220
6 
-
0.20
83 
1                     
FASSET
S 
0.06
52 
-
0.184
3 
0.00
74 
-
0.02
61 
1                   
BIG4 
0.36
43 
-
0.035
8 
0.01
85 
-
0.10
25 
-
0.092
7 
1                 
LTIME 
0.15
08 
-
0.136
0 
0.12
09 
-
0.13
55 
0.026
6 
0.05
41 
1               
SECTOR 
0.31
73 
-
0.144
2 
0.04
63 
-
0.03
99 
0.180
9 
0.13
36 
0.18
13 
1             
FOREIG
N 
0.20
84 
0.186
6 
0.10
55 
-
0.24
97 
0.011
8 
0.41
92 
0.22
85 
-
0.001
2 
1           
STATE 
0.02
11 
0.001
7 
0.12
79 
-
0.05
24 
0.165
4 
-
0.07
36 
-
0.03
86 
0.024
4 
-
0.1292 
1         
BOARDS
IZE 
0.11
83 
0.101
7 
0.21
34 
-
0.10
05 
-
0.015
6 
0.23
85 
0.12
65 
0.070
5 
0.3202 
-
0.15
36 
1       
BOARD
COMP 
0.01
06 
0.038
0 
0.16
22 
-
0.17
27 
-
0.026
9 
0.13
11 
0.10
17 
0.048
3 
0.1727 
-
0.05
86 
0.2287 1     
DUALIT
Y 
-
0.05
53 
-
0.055
0 
-
0.14
97 
0.04
67 
-
0.058
9 
-
0.09
42 
-
0.04
20 
-
0.028
3 
-
0.1034 
-
0.19
41 
-0.1538 -0.4493 1   
SUPERV 
-
0.06
82 
0.032
7 
0.00
53 
-
0.02
04 
0.007
8 
-
0.09
08 
0.12
89 
-
0.056
7 
-
0.1460 
0.12
31 
-0.1115 -0.0422 
-
0.0152 
1 
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Table.3: shows the summary statistics for all variables. In general, since no outliers in data can be observed, OLS estimation 
is appropriate. Then it is safe to go further with all estimations. 
Table.3. Summary statistics of all variables 
Variables Min Max Mean S.D 
SIZE (Billion VND) 13.43 31.58 1.90 3.91 
QRATIO (Times) 0.29 17.57 2.11 2.05 
PROFIT (%) -45.40 44.30 4.00 22.10 
DEBT (Times) 0.03 27.98 1.75 2.62 
FASSETS (%) 2.00 89.10 22.30 17.90 
LTIME (Years) 1.00 13.00 4.96 2.571 
FOREIGN (%) 0.00 49.00 14.80 16.40 
STATE (%) 0.00 79.70 17.80 22.80 
BOARDSIZE (people) 4.00 11.00 6.53 1.69 
BOARDCOMP (%) 0.00 100.00 63.90 17.20 
 
4.2 Findings 
The regression results are presented in table 4. The value 
of VIF for all independent variables is much smaller than 
10 (i.e. even smaller than 2), confirming that multi-
collinearity is not problematic. Moreover, Lagrange (LM) 
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that no 
autocorrelation in the error terms of the model (p-value = 
0.5432). Likewise, White test also shows the absence of 
heteroschedasticity in the model (p-value = 0.6565).2 
From table 4, it can be seen that the coefficient of SIZE, 
DEBT, AUDIT and SUPERV is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. However, the coefficient of 
STATE, BOARDCOMP and DUALITY is statistically 
negatively at the significance level of 10%, except for 
STATE at the 5% level of significance. These findings can 
be further discussed as follows. 
Firstly, regression results show that corporate size (SIZE) 
has a positive effect on its disclosure, implying that the 
higher the sales, the more information firm discloses in 
the financial statements. This is consistent with most 
previous empirical studies, such as Raffournier, 1995; 
Patton and Zelenka, 1997; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Phuong and Phuong, 2014, ...), and 
also in accordance with the agency theory and signaling 
theory. In fact, an increase in sales can be considered as a 
positive message about its businessesthat firm wants to 
send to shareholders and other outsiders. This is 
especially true for the real situations in Vietnam over the 
studied period, where the Vietnamese economy has been 
facing severe difficulties, and many firms have been 
dissolved and bankrupted. Given these circumstances, 
more good information (e.g., sales increases) is needed to 
disclose in attempts to increase the confidence of 
investors and credit institutions.  
                                                          
2Available upon request. 
Table.4: Regression results 
Dependent variable:Corporate disclosure index (Ij) 
Independent 
variables 
Coefficients Std. VIF 
Constant 0.670*** 0.085 
 
SIZE 0.008** 0.004 1.688 
QRATIO -0.001 0.002 1.371 
PROFIT 0.007 0.021 1.241 
DEBT 0.004** 0.002 1.320 
FASSETS -0.018 0.025 1.137 
BIG4 0.052*** 0.012 1.453 
LTIME 0.002 0.002 1.218 
SECTOR -0.010 0.010 1.223 
FOREIGN -0.033 0.033 1.627 
STATE -0.034* 0.020 1.184 
BOARDSIZE 0.003 0.003 1.251 
BOARDCOMP -0.087*** 0.029 1.381 
DUALITY -0.018* 0.010 1.368 
SUPERV 0.043*** 0.010 1.089 
No. of observations 198 
R2 0.310 
Adjusted-R2 0.257 
F-statistic 5.866 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 
Durbin-Watson 1.991 
Notes: *, ** and *** denote the significance levels of 
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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As for debt ratio (DEBT), the results show that firmwitha 
higher financial leverage tends to disclose more 
information, since as firm utilizes more debt the 
executives voluntarily disclose more information to 
increase its position to creditors, as well as to meet the 
information requirements by creditors. This is applicable 
with the current context of Vietnam, in which the use of 
excessive leverage by many firms have leaded to higher 
risk of insolvency and bankruptcies. Hence, the corporate 
disclosurehas become a way to show firm’s trust worthy 
to creditors. This result is in line withsome others, e.g., 
Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Barako, 2007, and is also 
consistent with the signaling theory.For auditing firm 
(AUDIT), it is obvious that firm audited by one of the 
Big4-auditorshas a higher corporate disclosure degree 
than the others.This shows a clear distinction between the 
quality of a Big4-auditor and that of other auditors from 
the perspectives of market participants in the country. As 
audited by a member of Big4-auditors, firm seems to 
bemore confident and ready to publish a greater amount 
of detailed information to outsiders. This finding is 
supported by previous research, (e.g., Patton and Zelenka, 
1997; Barako, 2007; Wang, Sewon et al., 2008). In line 
with Ho and Wong (2001), results show that the presence 
of supervision board (SUPERV) has a positive influence 
on the corporate disclosure degrees. Since the supervision 
board is responsible for overseeing the board of directors 
and managing director in implementing their due roles, its 
existence is considered as a means to guarantee for the 
credibility of financial statements to outsiders (Bradbury, 
1990). However, contradicting to previous studies, results 
for state ownership (STATE) in this study indicate that 
firm with higher state-owned shares disclose less 
information on financial statements than the others. 
Although being contrast to other previous studies, this 
finding isreasonable in the context of Vietnam. In 
Vietnam, there historically exists a common belief that 
state-dominated firms are problematic. Many state-
dominated firms suffered severely from a number of 
problems such as poor performance, bad corporate 
governance practices and disclosure of corruption by 
managers who are also governmental officials. E.g., in 
2014, more than 400 state-owned firms were bankrupted 
and dissolved, namely bankruptcy of 92 enterprises 
anddissolvent of 313.3Therefore, the presence of state 
ownership in firm does not necessarily mean an increase 
in the corporate disclosure level. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient of director board composition 
(BOARDCOMP) shows a significantly negative sign, 
                                                          
3http://kinhdoanh.vnexpress.net/tin-tuc/doanh-
nghiep/giai-the-pha-san-hon-400-doanh-nghiep-nha-
nuoc-2931637.html (Accessed on May, 5th 2017) 
indicating that firm with a higher proportion of non-
executive members to total number of director board 
tends to have a higher corporate disclosure degree. This is 
counter evidence against the agency theory, proposing 
that members of director board should not take any 
executive role in the firm. Nevertheless, this opposite 
effect (but is in line with Barako (2007)), may be 
explained by the fact that a high proportion of non-
executive board member in director board may imply a 
high number of managing executive members from 
outside the firm. In an emerging market like Vietnam, 
these outside executives tend to limit the corporate 
disclosure as a way to protect firm’s businesses from its 
competitors, which helps them to secure their positions in 
the firm.  As expected, the findings from dual role of 
director board’s chairperson (DUALITY) point out that if 
a company has a concurrent duty between chairperson 
and general director, the corporate disclosure degreeis 
reduced. In fact, as argued by the agency theory this dual 
role can easily lead to power concentration, resulting in 
possible manipulations of corporate financial activities, as 
well as restrictions on information disclosure by firms. 
The coefficient of all other independent variables 
including QRATIO, PROFIT, FASSETS, LTIME, 
SECTOR, FOREIGN and BOARDSIZEis not statistically 
significant at the traditional significance levels. 
Therefore, the statistical evidence about the influences of 
these factors on the corporate disclosure cannot be found 
in this study. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Due to the great importance of corporate disclosure on the 
financial statements, many empirical studies have been 
implemented for countries around the world. This study 
investigates the determinants of corporate disclosure in 
Vietnamese listed firms. Several findings from the study 
can be summarized. Regression results show that as 
predicted by the literature firm size, the use of financial 
leverage and the presence of supervision board have a 
positive effect on the corporate disclosure degree. 
Moreover, firm audited by a member of Big4 group tends 
to disclose more information than the others. However, 
contradicting to the literature, those factors comprising of 
state ownership and the proportion of non-executive 
members in director board show a negative effect on 
corporate disclosure.This counterevidence can be 
explained by real situations in Vietnam. Finally, thisstudy 
also supports the literature with the finding that firm with 
the concurrent role between chair of director board and 
managing director disclose less information than the 
others.  
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A number of recommendations have been put 
forward.Firstly, policy makers should pay more attention 
tothe quality of auditing firmsappointed to check financial 
statements of listed firms, since market participants seem 
to distinguish between financial statements audited by a 
Big4 and those audited by other auditing firms.Besides, 
stricter supervision rules should be considered on the 
structure of corporate management to improve the 
information disclosure quality by firms.  
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